Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

National report submitted by New Zealand

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to action 20 of the action plan set out in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The plan stipulates that States parties submit regular reports on their implementation of the action plan, and of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", as well as the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, recalling also the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

2. New Zealand considers that transparency is a principle to which all States (nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike) should adhere because it helps to reinforce compliance with Treaty obligations. The more that is known about how States implement their Treaty commitments, the greater the level of international trust in the regime. In this spirit, New Zealand has consistently lodged transparency reports since the 2000 Review Conference and, in the light of action 20, will continue to do so.

3. New Zealand is a strong supporter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its three pillars. We are dedicated to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons and continue to encourage national, regional and global efforts to realize this goal.

4. New Zealand supported General Assembly resolution 70/33 establishing an Open-Ended Working Group on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations and participated actively in all meetings of the Working Group in Geneva in 2016. New Zealand co-sponsored General Assembly resolution 71/258, mandating negotiations on a nuclear weapon prohibition treaty at the United Nations in New York in 2017. We are engaging constructively in these negotiations, including as an effective means of strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty and implementing article VI.

5. New Zealand has been a strong supporter of efforts undertaken to increase awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. New Zealand remains gravely concerned about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and continues to believe that the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons are never used again is through their total elimination, including through

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the full implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We engaged actively in the three international conferences on this issue held since 2013 in Norway, Mexico and Austria and sought to ensure that any outcome to the 2015 Review Conference would reflect the humanitarian initiative. New Zealand also co-sponsored General Assembly resolutions on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons (resolutions 70/47 and 71/46) and supported General Assembly resolutions on the humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons (resolutions 70/48 and 71/47).

6. New Zealand is an active member of the New Agenda Coalition[1] to promote nuclear disarmament. The Coalition sponsors an annual General Assembly resolution entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments". In its resolutions 70/51 and 71/54, the Assembly highlighted the central role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its binding nature at all times and in all circumstances. The Assembly called on all States parties to the Treaty to comply fully with all decisions, resolutions and commitments made at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences and called upon Member States to continue to support efforts to identify, elaborate and negotiate effective legally binding measures for nuclear disarmament.

7. New Zealand is associated with the two working papers submitted by the Coalition to the Preparatory Committee for its session in 2017: a working paper on a range of nuclear disarmament issues (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.9); and a working paper on strengthening accountability through enhanced transparency and measurability of the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.13). As a member of the New Agenda Coalition, New Zealand looks forward to building further on these at the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee and during the current review cycle.

8. New Zealand also works with Chile, Malaysia, Nigeria, Sweden and Switzerland (the members of the De-Alerting Group) in promoting action to lower the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems. In adopting the most recent resolution sponsored by the Group in 2016 (resolution 71/53), the General Assembly called for further practical steps to be taken to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems with a view to ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from high alert status and looked forward to the issue being addressed further during the next review cycle. New Zealand remains committed to progress in this area as part of a holistic approach to nuclear disarmament.

9. New Zealand remains a strong proponent of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and participates actively in the work of the Preparatory Commission in Vienna. New Zealand associated itself with the eighth Joint Ministerial Statement on the Treaty, adopted in New York on 21 September 2016, and is a core sponsor, with Australia and Mexico, of a regular General Assembly resolution on the Treaty, in which the Assembly has recognized the Treaty as a fundamental instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation (see General Assembly resolutions 71/86, 70/73 and 69/81).

10. Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, New Zealand urges all States to refrain from testing nuclear devices or from undertaking activities that would undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. New Zealand has publicly condemned all nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including the most recent nuclear tests on 6 January and 9 September 2016.

[1] Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa.

11. New Zealand was elected a non-permanent member of the Security Council for a two-year term from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2016. In this role, New Zealand supported, inter alia, resolution 2231 (2015) endorsing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran; resolution 2310 (2016) calling for early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; resolution 2325 (2016) calling for strengthened implementation and reporting under resolution 1540 (2004), which seeks to keep non-State actors from acquiring nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction; and resolutions 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016) strengthening sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

12. New Zealand welcomes the actions being undertaken under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to assure the international community of the compliance of the Islamic Republic of Iran with the deal. New Zealand is providing funding to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to assist with its verification of the compliance of the Islamic Republic of Iran with the Plan of Action.

13. New Zealand is deeply disappointed that sustained attempts to determine a programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament have not been successful, and that the Conference is failing to fulfil its role in progressing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In regard to the Conference's work programme, New Zealand supports the early negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty on fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, reflecting both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

14. Further to article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, New Zealand is a strong advocate of the role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in contributing to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. As a party to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 1985 (the Treaty of Rarotonga), New Zealand works to promote more engagement between States that belong to nuclear-weapon-free zones. We served as a Vice-President of the third Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia on 24 April 2015.

15. Together with Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa, New Zealand sponsors a General Assembly resolution entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas" (see resolutions 71/51 and 70/45). The resolution recognizes the contribution of nuclear-weapon-free zones to the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world and welcomes the fact that all nuclear-weapon-free zones in the southern hemisphere are now in force. It also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to withdraw any reservations or interpretive declarations contrary to the object and purpose of treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.

16. New Zealand welcomed the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference and the agreement to convene a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It is regrettable that the Conference has still not been held. We continue to call for full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and related agreements.

17. New Zealand fully complies with its commitments under article II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. New Zealand's Treaty obligations are legislated in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987.

18. Pursuant to article III of the Treaty, New Zealand has a comprehensive safeguards agreement, an additional protocol and a small quantities protocol in force

with IAEA. With no nuclear weapons, no nuclear energy generation, no nuclear reactors and no production of uranium or other relevant material, New Zealand conducts only very minor activities subject to safeguards. IAEA continues to assess New Zealand as being in full compliance with all its safeguards commitments.

19. New Zealand strongly supports a system of strengthened IAEA safeguards as an essential component of the global non-proliferation regime. New Zealand believes that universal application of the integrated safeguards system, including the additional protocol, would promote collective security, and calls upon all States that have not yet done so to conclude such agreements at the earliest possible date. New Zealand continues to seek opportunities to strengthen the application of nuclear safeguards and supports efforts by IAEA to develop the State-level concept as a means of increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards system.

20. New Zealand's new Radiation Safety Act 2016 has now entered into force, which enables New Zealand to more effectively meet its international obligations relating to radiation protection, safety, security and nuclear non-proliferation. In addition, New Zealand has ratified the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. In November 2015, New Zealand hosted an IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission. This was the first IPPAS mission to a country with such limited nuclear and radioactive holdings. New Zealand's Director of Radiation Safety gave a presentation at the International Conference on Nuclear Security in December 2016 on our experience as a small country hosting an IPPAS mission. We expect to host a follow-up mission in 2018.

21. New Zealand applies export controls to materials and dual-use goods that could be used in a nuclear weapons programme. The Government maintains cooperation and information exchanges among relevant government agencies involved in export controls and continues both domestic and international outreach in this area. The recent review of the Customs Act and moves under way to introduce domestic controls on arms brokering further strengthen the existing regime. We work actively to strengthen and coordinate international measures with other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and with the Zangger Committee.

22. Further to article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, New Zealand reaffirms the inalienable right of States parties to peaceful nuclear technology, in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty, and continues to support the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative. It is an active participant in the IAEA Regional Cooperative Agreement for the Asia-Pacific region and also provides funding for international projects for peaceful uses. New Zealand's view is that safeguards, safety, security and waste management should be integral parts of the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. New Zealand remains actively engaged in international efforts to strengthen nuclear safety and security, including through the recently concluded Nuclear Security Summit process, the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security and through our funding of the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.

23. New Zealand is an active member of the Vienna Group of Ten,[2] which produces working papers for the Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, compliance and verification, export controls, cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear safety, nuclear security and discouraging withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We support

[2] Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden.

the composite paper and recommendations put forward by the Vienna Group of Ten to the Preparatory Committee at its 2017 session.

24. Exercise Maru, a Proliferation Security Initiative, was hosted by New Zealand in November 2015. This was a discussion-based exercise focused on the Asia-Pacific region aimed at strengthening national, regional and international efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials. Exercise Maru was attended by 21 countries and the World Customs Organization. New Zealand also participated in Exercise Deep Sabre, hosted by Singapore in 2016, and will participate in Exercise Pacific Protector, hosted by Australia in September 2017.

25. In IAEA and other relevant forums, New Zealand continues to actively promote the safe transport of radioactive material. New Zealand is keen to ensure that the highest possible safety standards are adopted and applied by those transporting radioactive material, that coastal and other interested States receive notification in advance of shipments and that adequate liability arrangements are in place. New Zealand continues to participate in ongoing constructive dialogue, activities and coordination between relevant coastal and shipping States.

26. New Zealand remains committed to efforts to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education. Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (www.pnnd.org) helps New Zealand parliamentarians to stay abreast of international nuclear disarmament issues and initiatives through its regular updates and events at the Inter-Parliamentary Union Assemblies. The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs gives regular briefings to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and includes NGO participants in United Nations disarmament meetings and in Review Conference delegations.

27. The Government of New Zealand has established two funds to support a wide range of disarmament and peace education activities. The Disarmament Education UN Implementation Fund helps to fund citizen groups to implement the recommendations of the 2002 United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education. The Peace and Disarmament Education Trust regularly funds disarmament education programmes and initiatives. Other projects partially funded using these funds include the creation of Peace Cities; museum exhibitions; relevant internships; peace libraries; the production of educational material for schools, journalists and university students; and visits by leading disarmament experts.

28. Peace Movement Aotearoa is the national networking peace organization. It has extensive national networks, a comprehensive website (www.converge.org.nz/pma) and a Facebook page. It provides national coordination, publishes resources and updates and circulates New Zealand's statements for the national campaigns of five global humanitarian disarmament campaigns, including the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons Aotearoa New Zealand. Peace Movement Aotearoa promotes activities to mark key dates, including Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Day, the Global Day of Action on Military Spending, International Women's Day for Peace and Disarmament, International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, International Day of Peace, and Hiroshima and Nagasaki days. It regularly reports to United Nations human rights bodies, raising disarmament issues whenever possible as part of its work to strengthen the links between disarmament and human rights.

29. The Peace Foundation (www.peace.net.nz), based in Auckland, organizes the annual Schools' Peace Week event to commemorate the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and provides resources and activity ideas for schools nationally and globally. In 2016, 264 schools participated in New Zealand and

internationally in Pakistan, China, the United States of America, Jordan and New Caledonia. The theme for 2017 is "Aotearoa New Zealand: 30 Years Nuclear Free". The Foundation offers presentations to schools entitled "Responding to Armed Conflict", which cover topics such as nuclear disarmament, the thirtieth anniversary of New Zealand's nuclear free legislation, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the nuclear weapon ban treaty initiative, and disarmament and development. New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Day on 8 June highlights New Zealand's role in helping to create a nuclear free world. A new website (www.nuclearfreenz30.org.nz) hosts educational material for social studies and history teachers and students about nuclear disarmament-related topics currently being taught in a number of schools.

30. The Disarmament and Security Centre (www.disarmsecure.org) in Christchurch, a national peace and disarmament resource centre, organized a symposium at the University of Canterbury on 8 July 2016 to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the historic advisory opinion on nuclear weapons of the International Court of Justice. The Disarmament and Security Centre and Canterbury Museum have developed exhibitions on New Zealand's nuclear free policy, which are currently travelling round local libraries.

31. UN Youth New Zealand fosters global citizenship through a range of opportunities, including study tours to international Model United Nations conferences, as well as the organization of more than 20 Model United Nations conferences domestically. Its flagship Model United Nations conference is the NZ Model United Nations, a four-day national conference that attracts 250 delegates. Furthermore, it delivers an online Model United Nations initiative, the Diplomacy Competition, that runs as four month-long rounds throughout the year for over 600 students. Through the conferences and initiatives, young people are encouraged to critically evaluate issues such as the use of nuclear technology and weaponry, and the role of peacekeeping. The United Nations Association also organizes public meetings promoting nuclear disarmament and has created webquests on the United Nations that highlight the thirtieth anniversary of nuclear free New Zealand and the World Court Project.

32. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) Aotearoa promotes disarmament through its involvement in the Aotearoa New Zealand Campaign on Military Spending, the Aotearoa New Zealand Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the Aotearoa New Zealand Joint Working Group on Cluster Munitions and Landmines, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons Aotearoa New Zealand and White Poppies for Peace; and by publicizing international WILPF initiatives and resources — especially those produced by Reaching Critical Will and PeaceWomen — through its e-mail lists and Facebook page. WILPF Aotearoa organizes regular peace vigils throughout the year and Hiroshima and Nagasaki commemorations every August.

33. Unfold Zero (www.unfoldzero.org) is a project of PragueVision, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, the Basel Peace Office, the Mayors for Peace 2020 Vision Campaign, Aotearoa Lawyers for Peace and the Global Security Institute. It provides conference calls, e-mail updates and social media promotion related to nuclear disarmament. Abolition 2000 Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons also informs NGOs about the wide range of nuclear abolition initiatives around the world through its website (www.abolition2000.org), Facebook page and newsletters.

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Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Vienna, 2-12 May 2017

Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report by Japan

Action 20 of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons calls on States parties to submit regular reports on their implementation of the plan, of the 13 practical steps towards disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". Action 21 of the action plan states that, as a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. Japan submits this report in accordance with these commitments.

* Reissued for technical reasons on 31 May 2017.

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Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
I.	**Nuclear Disarmament**		
1	All States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.	Summary of national policy on nuclear disarmament, including any relevant initiatives and actions which serve to illustrate the policy. Membership in regional/multilateral groups that promote nuclear disarmament.	As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings, Japan remains strongly committed to strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime on all of its three pillars, and moving closer towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Japan is of the view that in order to make our steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons, it is essential to build up practical and concrete measures on the basis of cooperation between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, while not losing sight of a clear recognition of the humanitarian aspects of the use of nuclear weapons and an objective assessment of the severe international security environment. - Japan has been playing a leading role in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, a cross-regional group of non-nuclear weapon States, which has proposed concrete measures; - Japan is committed to making progress in advancing concrete and practical measures through, among others, promoting the transparency of nuclear forces, submitting resolutions calling for united action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons to the General Assembly, making active contributions towards an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pursuing the early commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and participating actively in discussions on nuclear disarmament verification. - Japan has been engaged in raising awareness on the reality of atomic bombings and clear recognition of its humanitarian consequences across borders and generations.

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
2	All States parties commit to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations.	National policy on irreversibility, verifiability and transparency, including any relevant initiatives and actions which serve to illustrate the policy. Support for relevant General Assembly resolutions that support irreversibility, verifiability and transparency.	Japan reaffirms the importance of the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations. - Japan calls upon all States to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the process of nuclear disarmament and non –proliferation through resolutions submitted to the General Assembly; - Japan submitted a working paper on nuclear-weapon State transparency to the 2015 Review Conference, which encouraged nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and to submit it annually in the context of strengthening the Treaty review process; - Japan, with the other 11 members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted a working paper on transparency by non-nuclear-weapon State parties to the 2015 Review Conference, which included a draft reporting template for non-nuclear-weapon States as well as other working papers on transparency to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty in 2012 and 2014 respectively.
3	In implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States commit to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	

Action	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
4	The Russian Federation and the United States of America commit to seek the early entry into force and full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and are encouraged to continue discussions on follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals.	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	
5	The nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security. To that end, they are called upon to promptly engage with a view to, inter alia:		
5 (a)	Rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, as identified in action 3;	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	
5 (b)	Address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process;	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
5 (c)	To further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	
5 (d)	Discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons;	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	
5 (e)	Consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security;	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	
5 (f)	Reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	
5 (g)	Further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
6	All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.	Support for the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament, including through support for relevant draft programmes of work of the Conference, Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers and/or General Assembly resolutions. Participation in any working groups on nuclear disarmament.	Japan supported the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament as a chair of the Conference in 2014. Japan also supported the decision put forward by the Romanian President to establish a working group on the way ahead, contained in document CD/WP.599/Rev.1 in 2017. Japan has consistently called for the adoption of a programme of work which leads to a negotiation of a disarmament treaty in the Conference. The following political figures called on all members of the Conference in the recent high-level segments of this body to adopt such a programme of work. - Mr. Motome TAKISAWA, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan in 2017 - Mr. Masakazu HAMACHI, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan in 2016 - Mr. Takashi UTO, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan in 2015 In the General Assembly resolution entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons" submitted by Japan and adopted by an overwhelming majority, Japan has stressed the need to continue to explore possibilities for overcoming the ongoing deadlock of more than two decades in the Conference on Disarmament for years.

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
7	All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument. The Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.	Support for the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to discuss effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, including through support for relevant draft programmes of work of the Conference, Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers and/or General Assembly resolutions.	In the General Assembly resolution entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons" submitted by Japan and adopted by an overwhelming majority, Japan has stressed the importance of security assurances by nuclear weapon States. Japan and the other 11 Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative members submitted a working paper on "Nuclear-weapon-free zones and negative security assurances" to the 2013 Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. Japan participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum Workshop on Promoting a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status of Mongolia, held in Mongolia in September 2015. Mr. Motome TAKISAWA, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, participated in the international conference on "Building a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World", which was hosted by Kazakhstan to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site.
8	All nuclear-weapon States commit to fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances. Those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so are encouraged to extend security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
9	The establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, is encouraged. All concerned States are encouraged to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols, and to constructively consult and cooperate to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of all such nuclear-weapon free zones treaties, which include negative security assurances. The concerned States are encouraged to review any related reservations.	(For all States) National efforts to support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. Support for relevant General Assembly resolutions and/or Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers that support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Name of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty to which your country is party. (For nuclear-weapon States) Summary of efforts (including current status and future prospects) to ratify the relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties or to review any related reservations on the ratification of such protocols. Current status of consultations and cooperation on entry into force of the relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zones.	Japan contributed to drafting of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia by organizing expert meetings in Sapporo, Japan, in October 1999 and April 2000. Japan has organized the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues with the United Nations, and nuclear-weapon-free zones have been one of the agenda of discussion. Japan has contributed to the discussion and promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Japan participated in the second and third Conferences of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia as an observer. Japan has supported General Assembly resolutions regarding five treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones and the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia. In the General Assembly resolution entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", submitted by Japan and adopted by an overwhelming majority, Japan stressed the importance of the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with the 1999 guidelines of the Disarmament Commission. Mr. Yamada, Ambassador of Japan to Mexico, participated in the ceremony of the fiftieth anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
10	All nuclear-weapon States undertake to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty with all expediency, noting that positive decisions by nuclear-weapon States would have the beneficial impact towards the ratification of that Treaty, and that nuclear-weapon States have the special responsibility to encourage Annex 2 countries, in particular those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify.	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	
11	Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty, all States commit to refrain from nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of that Treaty, and all existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions should be maintained.	Date of signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Current status of the reporting State's policy on the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions.	Japan signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 24 September 1996 and ratified it on 8 July 1997. Japan's "Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors" was amended when Japan ratified the Treaty.

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
12	All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty recognize the contribution of the conferences on facilitating the entry into force of that Treaty and of the measures adopted by consensus at the Sixth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in September 2009, and commit to report at the 2011 Conference on progress made towards the urgent entry into force of that Treaty.	Confirmation that commitment was met to report at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Article XIV Conference) held in 2011 on progress made towards the urgent entry into force of that Treaty. Summary of reports made at the subsequent Article XIV Conferences on progress made towards the entry into force of that Treaty.	September 2009 - August 2011 September 2009 – August 2011 In bilateral consultations, Japan urged several Annex 2 States that had not yet signed or ratified the Treaty to do so at the earliest opportunity. March 2010 Japan invited an Indonesian Diet member and a government official to visit International Monitoring System facilities hosted by Japan and to exchange views on the Treaty with the Japanese authorities. March 2010 Japan invited an Egyptian delegation headed by the Director of the Egyptian National Data Centre to visit International Monitoring System facilities hosted by Japan and to exchange views on the Treaty with Japanese authorities. September 2011 – August 2013 Japan took every appropriate opportunity in its bilateral meetings with non-ratifying Annex 2 States to encourage those States to sign and/or ratify the Treaty. JUNE 2013 – MAY 2015 June 2013–May 2014 Japan took every suitable opportunity in its bilateral contacts with the remaining Annex 2 States to encourage the signature and/or ratification of the Treaty. June 2014–May 2015 Japan took every suitable opportunity in its bilateral contacts with the remaining Annex 2 States, at both the political and official level, to encourage the signature and/or ratification of the Treaty. https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/article-xiv-conferences/

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
13	All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty undertake to promote the entry into force and implementation of that Treaty at the national, regional and global levels.	Activities to promote the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the national, regional and global levels, in particular a summary of efforts to encourage all States that have yet to do so to sign and ratify the Treaty (e.g., positions on General Assembly resolutions; participation in Article XIV Conferences or Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ministerial meetings; participation in Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers and/or national, regional, multilateral activities). Summary of national efforts to fully implement the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (e.g., national legislation or policies). List any nationals who participate in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Group of Eminent Persons.	Japan, along with the Republic of Kazakhstan, co-presided over the ninth Article XIV Conference on 29 September 2015 in New York. Since then, Japan, as the co-coordinator for the entry into force of the treaty, have led and coordinated international efforts for the promotion of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Japan hosted a Group of Eminent Persons meeting in Hiroshima, Japan, in August 2015 to discuss strategies for advancing the Treaty. Japan and the Republic of Kazakhstan adopted the summit level joint statement on the Treaty in Astana on 27 October 2015. Japan has co-chaired the ministerial meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty group, which convenes a high-level meeting biannually. On 21 September 2016, the eighth ministerial meeting was held in New York and adopted a joint ministerial statement. The State Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan attended the Treaty's twentieth anniversary ministerial meeting on 13 June 2016. Japan, together with Kazakhstan, supported a commemorative exhibition in Vienna, which outlined the Treaty Organization's history and its verification regime. Japan will host a regional conference for States in South-East Asia, the Pacific and Far East to promote the Treaty in this region in 2017. Japan co-sponsored and voted in favour of annual the General Assembly resolution entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty".

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
14	The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is to be encouraged to fully develop the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including early completion and provisional operationalization of the international monitoring system in accordance with the mandate of the Preparatory Commission, which should, upon entry into force of that Treaty, serve as an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory verification system with global reach, and provide assurance of compliance with that Treaty.	Summary of national efforts to construct, complete and/or certify International Monitoring System stations. Summary of national efforts to help the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization strengthen its verification regime (e.g., workshops, seminars, training, exercises, voluntary funding contributions and/or in-kind contributions). Summary of national efforts to help develop the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization's on-site inspection capabilities.	All of the International Monitoring System stations and a laboratory hosted by Japan (7 seismological stations, 2 radionuclide stations and 1 laboratory) have been certified by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Japan has made a voluntary contribution of approximately $2.4 million to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, to further boost its verification abilities in 2017. Japan made a voluntary contribution of $747,026 in 2011 and $455,000 in 2013. Towards the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Japan has provided a "Global Seismological Observation" training course since 1995 to introduce up-to-date technologies and knowledge in the field of global seismological observation.

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
15	All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. Also in this respect, the Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.	Support for launching negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, including through support for relevant draft programmes of work of the Conference on Disarmament, General Assembly resolutions and/or Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers. Summary of contributions to the Group of Governmental Experts on the subject. Summary of contributions to the high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group.	Japan strongly supports the objectives of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices known as a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, and has called for the early commencement of negotiations on the treaty in numerous occasions including in the General Assembly resolution, "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons" which Japan has submitted to the General Assembly every year. Japan, with the other member countries of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted a working paper on a fissile material cut-off treaty to the 2012 Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. In 2011, Japan and Australia co-hosted experts' side events in Geneva on the margins of the Conference on Disarmament to discuss technical aspects of a treaty and to maintain momentum for a commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. Japan, as a member of the Group of Governmental Experts on a fissile material cut-off treaty, actively participated and contributed to discussions in the Group, which met in Geneva in four sessions of two weeks each, in 2014 and 2015. Japan strongly supports the establishment of the high-level expert preparatory group on such a treaty and will engage actively and constructively in the discussions as a member of the group.

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
16	The nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	
17	In the context of action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes.	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	
18	All States that have not yet done so are encouraged to initiate a process towards the dismantling or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
19	All States agree on the importance of supporting cooperation among Governments, the United Nations, other international and regional organizations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament.	Any cooperation among governments, the United Nations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament. Summary of national, regional and international efforts to promote greater transparency, confidence and efficiency in the verification of nuclear disarmament.	Japan has been actively participating in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, which is an international initiative to further understand and find solutions to the complex challenges involved in the verification of nuclear disarmament, through sending experts to all working groups. Recognizing the Partnership as strong case for practical and concrete measures to realize the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, Japan hosted the third plenary meeting of the Partnership in Tokyo in June 2016. Japan has emphasized the importance of the efforts towards the development of nuclear disarmament verification capabilities in the General Assembly resolution entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", which Japan submitted to the Assembly. Japan, as co-sponsor, supported the General Assembly resolution entitled "Nuclear disarmament verification".
20	States parties should submit regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, on the implementation of the present action plan, as well as of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.	Year and official document symbol of all regular reports on the implementation of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.	Japan submitted a working paper on transparency by non-nuclear-weapon State parties to the 2015 Review Conference, which encouraged nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and to submit it annually in the context of strengthening the Treaty review process. Japan, with the other members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted a working paper on non-nuclear-weapon State transparency to the 2015 Review Conference, which included a draft reporting template for non-nuclear-weapon States. Japan, with the other members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted working papers on transparency to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treatyin 2012 and 2014 respectively.

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
21	As a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is invited to establish a publicly accessible repository, which shall include the information provided by the nuclear-weapon States.	(For nuclear-weapon States) Any agreed standard reporting form and determined reporting intervals. Summary of efforts to agree on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. (For non-nuclear-weapon States) Summary of efforts to encourage the nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and to determine an appropriate reporting interval.	Japan, with the other member countries of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted a joint working paper in 2012 on transparency of nuclear weapons to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, which included a draft standard nuclear disarmament reporting form. The Initiative also submitted a joint working paper in 2014 to the Preparatory Committee on "Increased transparency in nuclear disarmament", which called on nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and to submit the report regularly to implement action 20 and action 5. In addition, the Initiative submitted a joint working paper to the 2015 Review Conference to call on non-nuclear-weapon States to submit a report on implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference. Japan proposed that the points on reporting and strengthening the review process of the Treaty be included in the final document of the 2015 Review Conference.

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
22	All States are encouraged to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, in order to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.	Summary of efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education (e.g., contributions to the report of the Secretary-General, adding the subject to school curriculums, seminars, conferences, exhibitions, partnerships with civil society, public events, social media events, contests).	As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings, Japan is committed to ensuring that the humanitarian consequences and tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki will never be forgotten. With this aim, Japan places utmost importance on disarmament and non-proliferation education, especially for the younger generation. Japan has invited young diplomats from various countries through the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme every year since 1983. Japan has sponsored the United Nations Conferences on Disarmament Issues in different cities since 1989, where representatives of States, the United Nations, academic institutions and civil society from around the world engage in useful discussions. Japan submitted a joint working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education to the 2015 Review Conference, following joint working papers submitted jointly with the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative members to the 2012 and 2013 Preparatory Committees for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. Japan also made a joint statement on disarmament and non-proliferation education on behalf of the 76 countries at the 2015 Review Conference Japan started a programme entitled "Special Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons" in 2010 with the purpose of sharing the first-hand experience of atomic bombing survivors (Hibakusha). In addition, Japan launched a new programme entitled "Youth Communicator for a World without Nuclear Weapons" in 2013. Under this programme, young people are expected to share the tragic consequences of nuclear weapons and their thoughts about possible steps across borders and generations. Japan has undertaken efforts to make the testimonies of Hibakushas more widely available and translated them into thirteen languages. In 2015, the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in cooperation with the Japanese Government, opened a permanent exhibition on the atomic bombings at the United Nations Office in Vienna, following the ones in New York and Geneva, to promote understanding of the terrible devastation caused by the use of nuclear weapons.

Action number	Actions	Progress made in implementation (if applicable)	Actions undertaken by Japan
II.	**Nuclear non-proliferation**		
23	The Conference calls upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.	Summary of efforts to promote universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.	Japan took every opportunity in its bilateral meetings to encourage with non-ratifying States and in appropriate international forums. In the General Assembly resolution entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", submitted by Japan, Japan called upon all States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accede as non-nuclear-weapon States to the Treaty promptly and without any conditions to achieve its universality and, pending their accession to the Treaty, to adhere to its terms and to take practical steps in support of the Treaty.
24	The Conference re-endorses the call by previous review conferences for the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III of the Treaty.	Summary of safeguards agreements concluded with IAEA, such as a comprehensive safeguards agreement, Additional Protocol and/or Modified Small Quantities Protocol.	Japan signed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in March 1977, and the Agreement entered into force in December 1977. Japan signed its Additional Protocol in December 1998, and its Protocol entered into force December 1999.
25	The Conference, noting that 18 States parties to the Treaty have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, urges them to do so as soon as possible and without further delay.	Summary of efforts to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement, or to facilitate and encourage others to do so.	Japan continues to promote the universal acceptance of an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with the Model Additional Protocol to the Agreement as the international verification standard and call upon all States who have not yet done so to sign and bring into force the Additional Protocol.

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
26	The Conference underscores the importance in complying with the non-proliferation obligations, addressing all compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty's integrity and the authority of the safeguards system.	Summary of national efforts to comply with non-proliferation obligations. Examples of initiatives, including through Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers, that promote high international standards of compliance. Summary of IAEA conclusions about the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.	Japan has implemented the obligations of the IAEA the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol to it, and has been making efforts to ensure transparency of its nuclear activities. "Broader conclusion" has been consistently drawn since it was drawn for the first time in the IAEA safeguards statement for 2003. Japan committed to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. In particular, as a designated member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Japan has been cooperating fully with IAEA and providing appropriate support to the activities of the IAEA.
27	The Conference underscores the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the IAEA statute and the respective legal obligations of Member States. In this regard, the Conference calls upon Member States to extend their cooperation to the Agency.	Summary of national steps taken to address cases of non-compliance with Non-Proliferation Treaty non-proliferation obligations, including the implementation of sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council or statements in relevant international forums, such as the IAEA General Conference or Board of Governors.	Japan implements sanctions upon North Korea (sanctions imposed by Security Council and unilateral sanctions). Japan has delivered statements on North Korea issues in relevant international fora, such as IAEA General Conference and Board of Governors. Japan has co-sponsored North Korea resolutions in IAEA General Conference. Japan has been contributing to the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, including the assistance through IAEA.

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
28	The Conference encourages all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.	Date of signature and entry into force of an Additional Protocol agreement with IAEA. Summary of efforts to implement the Additional Protocol or to encourage and facilitate others to do so.	Japan has been actively working towards the universalization of the Model Additional Protocol and continues to provide necessary assistance, especially for Asian countries.
29	The Conference encourages IAEA to further facilitate and assist the States parties in the conclusion and entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Conference calls on States parties to consider specific measures that would promote the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreements.	Summary of national, regional and/or multilateral efforts to promote or assist other States in concluding or implementing a comprehensive safeguards agreement	Japan has organized outreach events in some countries, through the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non proliferation and Nuclear Security, and supported IAEA safeguards seminars to facilitate safeguards implementation including the Additional Protocol.
30	The Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources, and stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.	Summary of support for efforts to apply safeguards more widely in nuclear-weapon States (e.g., Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers)	The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative presented a working paper on "wider application of safeguards in the nuclear-weapons States" to the 2013 Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000182256.pdf

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
31	The Conference encourages all States parties with small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible.	Efforts to amend or rescind an existing Small Quantities Protocol.	Japan calls upon all States to adopt the modified Small Quantities Protocol, where relevant.
32	The Conference recommends that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented.	Summary of efforts to review and evaluate IAEA safeguards, including efforts to support decisions to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards.	Japan works to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of safeguards by the IAEA. In particular, as a designated member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Japan supports the Director General's and Board's efforts to continually strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards.
33	The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that IAEA continues to have all political, technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the Treaty.	Summary of status of payment of assessed contributions to IAEA. Summary of extrabudgetary, voluntary and/or in-kind contributions to IAEA.	Japan has been the second largest by scale of total payment of assessed contributions, extrabudgetary and voluntary contributions to the IAEA.
34	The Conference encourages States parties, within the framework of the IAEA statute, to further develop a robust, flexible, adaptive and cost effective international technology base for advanced safeguards through cooperation among Member States and with IAEA.	Summary of contributions to the development of an international technology base to help improve IAEA safeguards.	The Japan Support Programme for Agency Safeguards contributes to strengthening international safeguards through improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation by transferring Japanese technology and expertise to the IAEA. The Japan Atomic Energy Agency operates the Clean Laboratory for Environmental Analysis and Research as a member of the IAEA safeguards network laboratories.

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
35	The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.	Summary of efforts in export control regimes (e.g., the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the Wassenaar Arrangement), Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and its reporting mechanism and other arrangements (e.g., domestic legislation or bilateral agreements) that help to ensure nuclear-related exports do not lead to proliferation.	Japan has redoubled its nuclear non-proliferation efforts through the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee, as well as through the implementation of obligations related to nuclear non-proliferation such as the establishment of effective national export controls stipulated by Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Japan contributes positively to the activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group by, for example, assuming the role of the Point of Contact through its Permanent Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna.
36	The Conference encourages States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls.	Summary of the implementation of nuclear export control lists in domestic export control legislation and/or regulations.	Japan regularly updates its domestic export control regulations in accordance with changes in multilaterally agreed nuclear export control lists.
37	The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.	Summary of efforts to show that the safeguards and compliance record of a recipient State is taken into account in making nuclear export decisions.	Japan, in accordance with multilaterally agreed guidelines, considers whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making its export decisions.

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
38	The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes.	Support for the legitimate right of States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, such as by providing a list of States with which nuclear cooperation agreements have been completed.	Please refer to the following bluebook on Japan's foreign policy regarding the list of countries with which Japan has bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements : http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2016/html/chapter3/c030104.html
39	States parties are encouraged to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation among States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.	Summary of key policy criteria considered when determining whether or not to engage in nuclear cooperation with a State.	Please refer to the following bluebook on Japan's foreign policy regarding its policy on nuclear cooperation: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2016/html/chapter3/c030104.html
40	The Conference encourages all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.	Summary of efforts to strengthen the physical protection of nuclear facilities, particularly by the national regulatory agency. Summary of efforts undertaken to implement commitments made in the Nuclear Security Summit process.	The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit was the occasion to announce various efforts made by Japan. Please see the following page for summary of efforts. http://www.mofa.go.jp/dns/n_s_ne/page3e_000467.html

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
41	The Conference encourages all States parties to apply, as appropriate, the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)) and other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date.	Summary of efforts to apply the IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected). Timeline for any planned national reviews of physical protection policies and practices or any reviews that have been accomplished.	Japan takes various physical protection measures in line with the "Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors" etc. These measures are taken as recommended by the IAEA. The International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission in 2015 recognized that Japan has a robust and sustainable nuclear security regime, significantly enhanced in recent years. The latest measure was the revision of NRA ordinances in September 2016 to tackle insider threats. The trustworthiness check by operators will start around the summer of 2017.
42	The Conference calls on all States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the amendment to the Convention as soon as possible and encourages them to act in accordance with the objectives and the purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. The Conference also encourages all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and adopt the amendment as soon as possible.	Summary of progress in signing, ratifying and implementing the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment. Summary of efforts to promote the ratification and implementation of the Convention and its 2005 Amendment.	Japan became a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1988 and its 2005 Amendment in 2014. Please see the following page. http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000334.html

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
43	The Conference urges all States parties to implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004.	Summary of steps taken to implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Summary of steps taken to implement the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.	IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission issued its report to Japan. Please see 2.1 INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION https://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000148261.pdf Japan issued a National Statement at the Washington Nuclear Security Summit in 2010. Please see the following page. http://japan.kantei.go.jp/hatoyama/statement/201004/12statement_e.html

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
44	The Conference calls upon all States parties to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations, and calls upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard. The Conference also calls upon States parties to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations.	Summary of efforts to strengthen national capabilities against the illicit trafficking of nuclear material. Summary of efforts to provide assistance to other States to strengthen national capabilities against the illicit trafficking of nuclear material (e.g., commitments made in the context of the Nuclear Security Summit process, the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction). Information about participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative. Information about participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Summary of any reports provided in accordance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Status of participation in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database. Status of participation in the nuclear security activities of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).	Japan's recent matrix regarding its status of implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) approved by the 1540 Committee is: http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/documents/Japan%20revised%20matrix.pdf. Japan made proactive contributions during its Presidency of the Global Partnership in 2016. Japan proactively participated in the Proliferation Security Initiative exercises and meetings. Japan will host the Initiative's maritime interdiction exercise in 2018. Japan will host the plenary meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in Tokyo in June 2017. Japan participates in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database and reports when incidents occur.

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
45	The Conference encourages all States parties that have not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.	Summary of progress in signing, ratifying and implementing the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.	Japan became a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2007.
46	The Conference encourages IAEA to continue to assist the States parties in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of the State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, as well as systems on regional level. The Conference calls upon IAEA Member States to broaden their support for the relevant IAEA programmes.	Summary of activities to strengthen national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including establishing and maintaining a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material, as well as any regional-level systems. Summary of cooperation with IAEA on accounting and control of nuclear materials. Summary of support for IAEA programmes relevant to these actions, including the nuclear security relevant work of the IAEA nuclear safety and security programme.	Japan, through ISCN, actively organizes various bilateral seminars and workshops, international training courses for other member States personnel to enhance the functions of their State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material and national nuclear security regimes, some training courses for IAEA personnel, such as a training course on inspection methods for reprocessing processes both at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency experimental facilities and the Tokai Reprocessing Plant.
III. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy			
47	Respect each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle policies.	Summary of the types of peaceful uses of nuclear energy being pursued nationally (e.g., power generation, mining, medical, agricultural).	Japan pursues peaceful uses of nuclear energy in both power applications and various fields of non-power applications under the principle that the use of nuclear power must be accompanied at all its stages by commitments to and ongoing implementation of highest standards of safety and security and effective safeguards with full transparency.

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
48	Undertake to facilitate, and reaffirm the right of States parties to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	Summary of national policy on nuclear cooperation, including legislation on export controls.	See action 39.
49	Cooperate with other States parties or international organizations in the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.	Summary of national, bilateral, regional and/or multilateral efforts to further the development and application of nuclear technologies to areas that will help to meet the needs of developing countries.	See the latest IAEA Technical Cooperation Report as examples of Japan's efforts: https://www.iaea.org/technicalcooperation/Pub/Ann-Reports/
50	Give preferential treatment to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.	Summary of international efforts to assist developing countries, identifying those activities which are undertaken through the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme.	See the latest IAEA Technical Cooperation Report as examples of Japan's efforts: https://www.iaea.org/technicalcooperation/Pub/Ann-Reports/
51	Facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty, and eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.	List of the total number of countries with which nuclear cooperation agreements are in effect (see actions 37 and 38). List of the total number of nuclear cooperation agreements awaiting implementation.	See Action 38.

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
52	Continue efforts, within IAEA, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of its technical cooperation programme.	Summary of efforts to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, such as by advocating for accountability and transparency in the operation of the Programme, supporting the implementation of recommendations made by the Agency's Office of Internal Oversight Services, etc.	Japan is actively participating in relevant meetings held by the IAEA to enhance effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, including Board of Governors and General Conference.
53	Strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	Summary of efforts in the IAEA Board of Governor's Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee. Summary of efforts to strengthen the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, including through any voluntary financial or in-kind contributions.	Japan is actively participating in the Governor's Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee, and Japan has also contributed to the Technical Cooperation Fund and Peaceful Uses Initiative to strengthen the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme.
54	Make every effort and to take practical steps to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable.	Rate of attainment on assessed voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund.	Japan's rate of attainment to the Technical Cooperation Fund has been 100 per cent continuously.

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
55	Encourage all States in a position to do so to make additional contributions to the initiative designed to raise 100 million dollars over the next five years as extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA activities, while welcoming the contributions already pledged by countries and groups of countries in support of IAEA activities.	Summary of any voluntary contributions to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative or other extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA.	Japan has contributed over $26 million to the Peaceful Uses Initiative in total (as of March 2017).
56	Encourage national, bilateral and international efforts to train the necessary skilled workforce needed to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	Summary of national, bilateral and international efforts with regard to capacity-building and human resource development on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	See the below links for examples of Japan's efforts: - Japan Atomic Energy Agency/Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security (https://www.jaea.go.jp/04/iscn/activity/capabuil_en.html) - Japan Nuclear Human Resource Development Network (http://jn-hrd-n.jaea.go.jp/en/) - Regional Cooperation Agreement (http://www.rcaro.org/)
57	Ensure that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by commitments to and ongoing implementation of safeguards as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and security, consistent with States' national legislation and respective international obligations.	Title and date of key national legislation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	See the below links for examples. - IAEA Country Nuclear Power Profiles 2015 Edition (Japan): http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/CNPP2015_CD/countryprofiles/Japan/Japan.htm)

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
58	Continue to discuss further, in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner under the auspices of IAEA or regional forums, the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities of creating mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the back-end of the fuel cycle without affecting rights under the Treaty and without prejudice to national fuel cycle policies, while tackling the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues, including, in this regard, the requirement of IAEA full scope safeguards.	Summary of efforts to develop multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.	Please see IAEA resolution (GC(60)/RES/12), "Strengthening the Agency's activities related to nuclear science, technology and applications." Japan supports the resolution. The "B Nuclear Power Applications" in the resolution refers to such items as jointly the improving of innovations in nuclear reactors, fuel cycles as well as discussion among interested Member States on the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC60/Resolutions/index.html

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to be provided (if applicable)	Actions undertaken by Japan
59	Consider becoming party, if they have not yet done so, to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and to ratify its amendment so that it may enter into force at an early date.	Status vis-à-vis the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Status vis-à-vis the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment could be reiterated (see actions 42 and 45).	Japan has already concluded: - Convention on Nuclear Safety (1995) - Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (1987) - Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (1987) - Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (2003) - International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2007) - 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2014)

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
60	Promote the sharing of best practices in the area of nuclear safety and security, including through dialogue with the nuclear industry and the private sector, as appropriate.	Summarize how international best practices on nuclear safety and security have been implemented nationally. Summarize any contributions to the IAEA Safety Standards Series, the IAEA Nuclear Security Series and review meetings of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Summarize any participation in or contributions to workshops to share best practices, including with the nuclear industry, private sector and non-governmental organizations such as the World Institute for Nuclear Security.	Please refer to Japan's national report for the 7th Review Meeting of Convention on Nuclear Safety in 2017: https://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000170377.pdf Please refer to Japan's national report for the 5th Review Meeting of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in 2015: https://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000110078.pdf Japan issued Statement by the Head of the Japanese Delegation, State Minister of Cabinet Office Hirotaka Ishihara, to the 60th IAEA General Conference, 26 September 2016. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000220955.pdf Japan issued Statement by State Minister for Foreign Affairs Kentaro Sonoura, Head of the Delegation of Japan to the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, 5 December 2016. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000209417.pdf The International Conference on Nuclear Security holds a workshop with the World Institute for Nuclear Security every year. The 6th such workshop was held in Tokyo on 11 and 12 January 2017. The participants talked about how to tackle insider threats and check trustworthiness to ensure nuclear security.
61	Encourage States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use, where technically and economically feasible.	Summarize any national efforts to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear programmes and/or convert nuclear facilities to low-enriched uranium. Summarize any international assistance provided to other States to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear programmes.	Japan issued its National Progress Report 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. Please see the following page. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000144982.pdf

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
62	Transport radioactive materials consistent with relevant international standards of safety, security and environmental protection, and to continue communication between shipping and coastal States for the purpose of confidence-building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.	Summarize national regulations on the transport of radioactive materials, noting in particular the implementation of the IAEA updated standards on transport regulations (No. SSR-6, 2012).	With the "Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors", "Ship Safety Act", "Civil Aeronautics Act" and other national regulations, Japan implements IAEA Regulation No. SSR-6, 2012 and other international standards on transport regulations. Shipping States, including Japan, continued communication with coastal states for the purpose of confidence-building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.
63	Put in force a civil nuclear liability regime by becoming party to relevant international instruments or adopting suitable national legislation, based upon the principles established by the main pertinent international instruments.	List the date of signature and ratification of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and/or the Paris Convention on Third-Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy. List the title and date of adoption of any national legislation on nuclear liability.	Japan signed and concluded Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage on 15 January 2015. As a result, the Convention entered into force on 15 April 2015. Please refer to the following link (IAEA Country Nuclear Power Profiles 2015 Edition (Japan)) regarding Japan's status vis-à-vis international nuclear liability instruments as well as national legislation on nuclear liability: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/CNPP2015_CD/countryprofiles/Japan/Japan.htm)

Action number	*Actions*	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*	*Actions undertaken by Japan*
64	The Conference calls upon all States to abide by the decision adopted by consensus at the IAEA General Conference on 18 September 2009 on prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.	Summarize national position and efforts taken to prohibit [and prevent] armed attacks on or threats against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes during their operation or while under construction.	Japan issued its National Progress Report 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. Please see the following page. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000144982.pdf In order to prevent armed attacks on or threats against nuclear facilities, security guards and police officers protect nuclear facilities and they conduct regular training to enhance their capability.

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Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Canada

Action 20 of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons calls on States parties to submit regular reports on their implementation of the action plan, as well as of the 13 practical steps towards disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". Canada submits the present report to further fulfil these commitments. This report updates the information provided in the reports submitted by Canada to the Preparatory Committee at its sessions held in 2012 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/10), 2013 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/9) and 2014 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/8 and 9) and to the Review Conference in 2015 (NPT/CONF.2015/34).

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since April 2015*

Nuclear disarmament

1	Canada's international security policy continues to promote a step-by-step process towards the non-proliferation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons consistent with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) obligations and in a manner that promotes strategic stability for all. Canada promotes this policy with its allies and partners in NATO, the Group of Seven (G7), the Francophonie, the Organization of American States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, among others.

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Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since April 2015*
2	Canada continues to promote the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in the implementation of Treaty obligations, most notably through co-sponsorship of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative joint working paper on transparency by all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.17). Canada co-sponsored General Assembly resolution 71/49, entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", which emphasized the importance of applying the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency to the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Canada co-sponsored General Assembly resolution 71/67, entitled "Nuclear disarmament verification", which calls for the development of practical and effective nuclear disarmament verification measures as key for ensuring compliance with disarmament obligations and building confidence between States with and without nuclear weapons.
3	Not applicable
4	Not applicable
5	Not applicable
6	Canada continues to support the creation of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament as part of a balanced and comprehensive programme of work. In 2016, Canada supported the proposal to begin negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a fissile material treaty. Canada also participated in the 2016 meetings of the Open-ended Working Group on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. Canada joined the consensus on the proposal by Romania in the Conference on Disarmament (CD/2090) to create a working group on the "way ahead" to advance discussions on disarmament issues in 2017, including nuclear disarmament.
7	Canada continues to support the creation of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to address effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as part of a balanced and comprehensive programme of work. Canada joined the consensus on the working group on the "way ahead" (CD/2090) to address multiple disarmament issues, including general nuclear disarmament, a fissile material cut-off treaty and negative security assurances in 2017.
8	Not applicable
9	Canada supports the convening of a conference on a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction to be attended by all States in the region on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at. Canada joined the consensus on General Assembly resolution 71/29, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East"; resolution 71/26, entitled "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty"; resolution 71/65, entitled "Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia"; and resolution 71/43, entitled "Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status". Canada voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 71/51, entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas".

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since April 2015*
10	Not applicable
11	Canada signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 24 September 1996 and ratified it on 2 December 1998. Canada's Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Implementation Act is being implemented provisionally pending the Treaty's entry into force.
12	Canada provides annual contributions on its efforts to promote the entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty for inclusion in the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly.
13	Canada co-hosted the eighth Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in New York on 21 September 2016. The meeting produced a Joint Ministerial Statement that, inter alia, called on the remaining States listed in annex 2 of the Treaty that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty. Canada co-sponsored and voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 71/86, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty". Canada also co-sponsored Security Council resolution 2310 (2016), which, inter alia, called for the Treaty's early entry into force and for all States to maintain voluntary moratoriums on nuclear test explosions. Canada continues to support the ongoing G7 initiative to make diplomatic representations to advance the entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
14	All of the 16 stations and laboratories hosted by Canada as a part of the International Monitoring System for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty have been completed and certified by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. In September 2015, representatives from Natural Resources Canada participated in an airborne field test in Langenlebarn, Austria, that involved the use of the airborne radiation detection equipment contributed by Canada to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in September 2013. In February 2017, Canada hosted a cold-weather airborne field test in Ottawa that also involved the use of the aforementioned equipment.
15	Canada has actively called for the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the Conference on Disarmament or in another international forum. Canada supported the proposal for a fissile material treaty negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament in 2016. In 2016, Canada also submitted a report to the United Nations Secretary-General containing views on the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on a fissile material cut-off treaty as contained in A/70/81. At the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored resolution 71/259 on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and was nominated to chair the high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group in 2017-2018 to make recommendations on substantial elements of a future treaty. As part of this process, in March 2017, Canada chaired an informal consultative meeting, open to all Member States, to share views on the report of the Group of Governmental Experts.
16	Not applicable

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since April 2015*
17	Canada continues to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure that surplus fissile material no longer required for military purposes is irreversibly removed (applicable only to nuclear-weapon States).
18	In conformity with its legal obligations through its comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), arising from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and as verified by regular IAEA inspections, Canada does not operate any facility that produces fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
19	Canada participates actively in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, including all four plenaries to date, and is represented in each of the three working groups. Canada also engages in the intersessional meetings of the working groups and is contributing to discussion papers on the assessment of verification requirements. Canada supported resolution 71/67 on nuclear disarmament verification, adopted by the General Assembly at its seventy-first session, to create in 2018-2019 a Group of Governmental Experts on nuclear disarmament verification. Canada hosted consultations with Canadian civil society on the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification on 22 February 2017. Canada will be providing funding through its weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to support the efforts of the Nuclear Threat Initiative to serve as the secretariat of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.
20	Canada co-sponsored the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative working paper on transparency by all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.17), which included an updated reporting template to provide greater transparency about steps that have been taken to implement the 2010 action plan.
21	In partnership with the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, detailed comments and feedback were provided to each of the nuclear-weapon States on their Non-Proliferation Treaty implementation reports that were submitted at the 2015 Review Conference with a view to strengthening the quantity, quality and frequency of such reports. Canada endorses the draft reporting form of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative for all States parties to the Treaty as a template for providing greater transparency on nuclear disarmament activities by the nuclear-weapon States. This form was submitted at the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee as a part of working paper NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.17.
22	Continuing a long-standing partnership with a Canadian non-governmental organization (The Simons Foundation), on 26 February 2016 and 9 February 2017, the International Security Research and Outreach Programme of Global Affairs Canada awarded a total of eight scholarships to postgraduate students at Canadian universities who produced research papers on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. Canada co-sponsored General Assembly resolution 71/57, entitled "United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education". On 10 April 2017, Global Affairs Canada held consultations with experts from Canadian civil society organizations to promote transparency, openness and education on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation issues.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since April 2015*
23	Canada continues to call upon States that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.
Nuclear non-proliferation	
24	Canada's comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA has been in place since 21 February 1972. Canada's additional protocol with IAEA has been in place since 8 September 2000.
25	Canada continues to urge all States that have not yet done so to complete and implement a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol with IAEA, which we consider is the verification standard pursuant to article III of the Treaty. Within the context of IAEA, during negotiations of the resolution on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards, Canada, in cooperation with other countries, resisted attempts to revise language that would eliminate the call for universalization of comprehensive safeguards agreements.
26	Since 2005, IAEA has concluded on an annual basis that all nuclear material in Canada remains in peaceful purposes. This broader conclusion pursuant to Canada's comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol provides the highest level of confidence that Canada is in compliance with its non-proliferation commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
27	Canada welcomes the ongoing implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which provides a framework to establish confidence that the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran are peaceful in nature. To date, Canada has contributed $10 million to support IAEA efforts to monitor and verify the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and its predecessor, the Joint Plan of Action. At the IAEA General Conference and IAEA Board of Governors meetings in 2015 and 2016, Canada reiterated its condemnation of the illicit nuclear weapons development programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including nuclear testing, the production of fissile material, both enriched uranium enrichment and separated plutonium, and ballistic missile testing. Canada continues to call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully with all relevant Security Council resolutions, return to compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with its safeguards agreement with IAEA, and to fulfil its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. At the IAEA General Conference and IAEA Board of Governors meetings in 2015 and 2016, Canada also called on the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the Agency to resolve all outstanding issues regarding its non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, particularly with regard to the Dayr al-Zawr site and other functionally-related sites identified by IAEA.
28	Canada's additional protocol with IAEA was signed on 24 September 1998 and entered into force on 8 September 2000.
29	Canada continues to support the ongoing G7 initiative to make diplomatic representations to advance the universalization of the additional protocol.
30	Not applicable
31	Not applicable

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since April 2015*
32	Canada welcomes IAEA efforts to apply the State-level concept to all States with a safeguards agreement in force, as part of the continuing evolution of safeguards implementation necessary to increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. We look forward to the next report by the IAEA Director General, which will outline the Agency's experience in implementing updated State-level approaches.
33	Canada paid its 2017 assessed contribution to the IAEA regular budget and its voluntary assessed contribution to the Technical Cooperation Fund on time and in full.
34	Through the Canadian Safeguards Support Programme, Canada contributes to the research, development and support of safeguards equipment and techniques for both domestic and international use aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards.
35	Canada is a member of and an active participant in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee and the Wassenaar Arrangement. On 16 March 2016, Canada submitted an updated national implementation action plan to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the only country to have submitted two plans. In 2016, Canada also updated its national point of contact information with the Committee. At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Canada co-led with Spain and the Republic of Korea a gift basket on promoting full and universal implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which was co-sponsored by 37 States and the European Union, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the United Nations. Canada actively participated in the comprehensive review process of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). On 15 December 2016, Canada participated in the Security Council open debate on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, called for the full and universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and co-sponsored resolution 2325 (2016), which endorsed the comprehensive review and its recommendations.
36	Canada's export control system is consistent with the lists of multilateral nuclear export control mechanisms in which it participates.
37	Canada's national export control system ensures that exports of controlled goods and technology, including nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items, are not authorized where the proposed export would be inconsistent with Canada's foreign and defence policy (including where there is deemed to be an unacceptable risk of diversion to a weapons of mass destruction programme or to an unsafeguarded facility, or when an export would be otherwise contrary to Canada's non-proliferation policy and international commitments and obligations).
38	Canada has 30 nuclear cooperation agreements in place with 48 States, including developing countries, to facilitate mutually beneficial exchanges for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
39	Cooperation by Canada with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy takes fully into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country, as well as their implementation of nuclear safety standards and nuclear security guidance and recommendations.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since April 2015*
40	Canada maintains the highest level of effective physical protection at the domestic level through a robust regulatory framework that integrates relevant safety, security and safeguard elements, the implementation of strong physical protection measures and an industry that fully understands and fulfils its responsibilities. This is reinforced by close cooperation on nuclear security issues between the regulator, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, federal and provincial law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the industry, foreign Governments and international organizations. At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced over Can$42 million for new projects over the next two years (2016/18) through Canada's weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to enhance nuclear and radiological security worldwide. These projects include funding for bilateral projects to combat illicit trafficking, improve physical protection of nuclear facilities, promote safe management and disposal of radioactive sources and improve transportation security. The projects also include funding for international organizations and initiatives, including the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, INTERPOL and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Canada also made domestic commitments at the Nuclear Security Summit in 2016. Canada is in the process of establishing a national nuclear forensics capability with a national nuclear forensics library, which will further enhance Canada's ability to prosecute acts of nuclear terrorism and the criminal use of nuclear materials. Please see section 61 for more details on Canada's Nuclear Security Summit commitments to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium. An additional highlight for Canada in the implementation of previous Summit commitments was the hosting of our first IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission in October 2015, for the purpose of evaluating our domestic nuclear security regime. The mission report concluded that Canada's nuclear security regime is robust, strong and sustainable.
41	Canada maintains strong physical protection measures for its nuclear materials, including armed on-site response forces, constant threat monitoring, enhanced security screening, a comprehensive drill and exercise programme and robust perimeter protection. Physical protection in Canada is strengthened by a rigorous nuclear material accounting system that tracks nuclear materials, in line with Canada's international commitments.
42	Canada ratified the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in December 2013 and welcomed its entry into force on 8 May 2016. Canada also supported a series of workshops aimed at promoting the ratification and implementation of the Convention and its 2005 amendment to countries that had not yet signed up. Through the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, Canada is also working on enhancing legislative frameworks to help countries with the implementation of the Convention and its 2005 amendment (see section 44 below for more details).
43	Canada remains committed to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. Canada also strongly supports efforts by IAEA to develop internationally harmonized guidance for implementing the recommendations of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in relation to the long-term management of disused radioactive sources.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since April 2015*
	Canada provided funding to IAEA through its weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to allow approximately 40 experts from Latin America and Africa to attend the fourth international conference on the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources that took place in Vienna in May-June 2016. Canada is providing further funding to the IAEA through its weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to allow approximately 40 experts from Latin America and Africa to attend the fifth international conference on the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources that will take place in Vienna in June 2017.
44	See action 40 regarding assistance to States parties with a view to strengthening national capabilities against illicit trafficking of nuclear material. At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Canada co-sponsored a joint statement with the Republic of Korea on concrete initiatives in support of the full and universal implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which was supported by over 30 countries, as well as the United Nations. Canada is an endorser of the Proliferation Security Initiative, is a member of its Operational Experts Group and is leading the Critical Capabilities and Practices Review Team in 2016-2017. In October, 2016, Canada successfully advocated the inclusion of text in the Declaration of Port of Spain at the twelfth Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas, which committed endorsers to pursue universal implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and encourage endorsement of the Proliferation Security Initiative. In January 2017, Canada co-organized with Slovakia and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime a workshop under the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to address challenges in adopting or updating national legal frameworks for nuclear security, highlight obligations under international legal instruments against nuclear terrorism and consider practical models for implementing those obligations. The workshop brought together 88 experts from 23 partner countries and five international organizations. Canada also provided assistance through its weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to remove high activity disused sealed radioactive sources from South America; to enhance regulatory frameworks for nuclear security in African States; to strengthen nuclear security in Ukraine; to support the INTERPOL subdirectorate for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials and capacity-building activities in Latin America and South-East Asia; and to strengthen border security, counter nuclear smuggling and build critical incident response capacity in Jordan.
45	Canada ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in November 2013.
46	The technical capabilities of a country's system and the nature and the scope of cooperation between that system and IAEA are two of the State-specific factors that IAEA considers when developing a State-level approach to safeguards. Canada continues to work with IAEA to further develop the State-level safeguards concept.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since April 2015*

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

47	Canada possesses an indigenous nuclear power reactor system and a broad and diverse nuclear sector, and is a reliable supplier of uranium, nuclear equipment and technology, and radioisotopes.
48	See action 39.
49	Canada provides experts, equipment and technology to many developing States parties through technical cooperation. Canada has nuclear cooperation agreements in place with many developing countries. Cooperation has included exports of nuclear power reactors, nuclear material and equipment. Canada provided $2.3 million to support the IAEA Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories (ReNuAL) project in 2016. We also provide expertise to support technical cooperation activities and host related events in Canada.
50	See action 49 for information on Canada's nuclear cooperation with developing countries.
51	See action 38 for information on Canada's nuclear cooperation agreements.
52	In the context of the IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee, the Board of Governors and General Conference, Canada regularly proposes initiatives to improve the governance and management of the Technical Cooperation Programme, including: greater strategic management of the Programme; encouraging IAEA member States to pay their full voluntary assessed contribution to the Technical Cooperation Fund; encouraging countries in a position to do so to contribute to funding their own technical cooperation projects through the government cost-sharing mechanism rather than drawing from the Technical Cooperation Fund; and encouraging the implementation of outcome monitoring for all technical cooperation projects.
53	Canada is continuing long-standing efforts to improve governance and management of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund through the IAEA policymaking organs and relevant working groups. Despite some progress in recent years, additional work remains to be done in the areas of strategic management, outcome monitoring, which countries draw on the Fund and member State payment of contributions to the Fund. Canada will continue to engage IAEA member States to push for positive changes in these areas.
54	See action 33 for information on Canada's contributions to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund.
55	Canada contributed almost $2.5 million via the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative in 2016-2017 and provided in-kind resources to Peaceful Uses Initiative projects.
56	Canada is an active and regular contributor of support and expertise to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. Canada has hosted fellowship participants and scientific visitors from the Americas, Asia, Africa and Europe and hosted Technical Cooperation Programme meetings in the areas of nuclear safety and regulatory activities. Canadian lecturers and experts have contributed technical training in the areas of human health, agriculture and food security, water and the environment, energy, radiation technology and security and safety.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since April 2015*
57	See actions 24, 28 and 42 for information on the comprehensive safeguards agreement, the additional protocol and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Nuclear Energy Act of 1985 (amended in 1997) relates to the development and utilization of nuclear energy in Canada. The Nuclear Safety and Control Act came into force in May 2000, replacing the Atomic Energy Control Act. It established the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission as the national regulator and set out its mandate, responsibilities and powers. These include domestically regulating the development, production and use of nuclear energy and the production, possession and use of nuclear substances, prescribed equipment and prescribed information.
58	Canada supported the decision of the IAEA Board of Governors in December 2010 to establish an IAEA low enriched uranium bank, welcomes the progress made to date in establishing the fuel bank and bringing it towards operation, and will continue to assess proposed fuel assurance mechanisms based on their individual merits.
59	Canada ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety in December 1995. Canada ratified the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident in January 1990. Canada ratified the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency in August 2002. Canada ratified the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in May 1998. See actions 42 and 45 for more information on the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its amendment and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Canada had ratified both instruments as of December 2013.
60	Canada is providing funding through its weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to the World Institute for Nuclear Security to develop a nuclear security support centre in Mexico that will provide the Central American region with additional support in enhancing nuclear security, including through the provision of certified training. Canada continues to provide in-kind support to IAEA for the development of IAEA safety standards and IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents. Canada actively participates in the review meetings of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and presided over the most recent Convention on Nuclear Safety review meeting.
61	Canada is making good progress on its initiatives to reduce stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU), including through repatriating HEU to the United States of America, in accordance with previous Nuclear Security Summit commitments to repatriate HEU spent fuel originating from the United States in 2010 and HEU liquid in 2012. At the Nuclear Security Summit in 2014, leaders agreed to continue minimizing the use of HEU in the production of medical isotopes, and in October 2016 Canada ceased routine production of the medical isotope molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) at the National Research Universal reactor. From November 2016 to March 2018, the reactor will remain in "hot standby" mode to produce isotopes as an "international supplier of last resort" in the event of a prolonged and unforecasted global shortage that cannot otherwise be mitigated.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since April 2013*
62	Canadian transport regulations for radioactive materials are based on the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material.
63	Canada signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage in December 2013. On 26 February 2015, the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act was enacted.
64	Canada notes and reaffirms the consensus reached at the fifty-third session of the IAEA General Conference that any armed attack on and threat against safeguarded nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the IAEA Statute.